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Breaking Away or Still Broken? A
Critique of the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s Treatment of the Severe or
Pervasive Standard for Sexual
Harassment Hostile Work Environment
Cases in Kenneh v. Homeward Bound
Anne Bolgert†
Sexual harassment is both a severe and pervasive problem in
American workplaces.1 This is disproportionately true for women,
particularly women in low-wage positions, both because of large
power imbalances between workers and employers and because
women in low-wage positions are more likely “to accept [the
harassment] because they [cannot] afford to lose their jobs.”2
†. J.D. 2022, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S.W., 2015, University of
Wisconsin-Madison; B.S., 2014, University of Wisconsin-Madison. I would like to
thank Professor Amy Monahan and Note & Comment Editor Stephen Earnest for
their time and guidance during the writing process, the Staff Members and Editors
of the Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality for their diligent work preparing this
Article for publication, and my wife, Emily McKinney, for her patience, support, and
encouragement.
1. See, e.g., ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 12.01, 7 (5th ed. 2022 & Supp. 1 2019) (citing an Associated Press-NORC
Center for Public Affairs Research 2017 poll finding that “[t]hree in 10 women and 1
in 10 men say that they’ve personally experienced sexual misconduct at work” and
“that a majority of Americans think broad sectors of society are not doing enough to
prevent sexual misconduct, including institutions such as the entertainment
industry, colleges and universities, state and federal governments, the military and
the news media. ‘The sweeping nature of the national reckoning shows no sign of
being resolved soon,’ the poll found”).
2. Id. at 1, 3 (citing Center for American Progress analysis of Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission data which found that “the most sexualharassment charges filed by workers from any one industry between 2005 and 2015
were in one sector accommodation and food services,” as well a 2016 Hart Research
Associates study); see also LISA RABASCA ROEPE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: HAVE
WORKPLACES BECOME LESS TOLERANT OF INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIOR? (2020),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqr_ht_harassment_2020 [https://perma.cc/
X6VU-HE4W] (explaining harassment often occurs by those in positions of power,
which makes workers feel deterred from reporting to stay in their superior’s good
graces); Trina Jones & Emma E. Wade, Me Too?: Race, Gender, and Ending
Workplace Sexual Harassment, 27 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 203, 209 (2020) (“The
voices of relatively privileged women . . . tend to shape discussions of sexual
harassment and sexual assault, even though such violations disproportionately
affect more marginalized women.”).
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Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court-developed “severe
or pervasive” standard, which federal courts and most states apply
in determining whether workplace conduct constitutes sex
discrimination through creation of a hostile work environment, has
made it extraordinarily difficult for plaintiffs to seek justice and
relief after being subjected to workplace sexual harassment.3
However, based on the calls for change from women’s and
workers’ advocates and the shift in norms associated with the
#MeToo movement, several states have sought to break away from
the federal sexual harassment standard and case law.4 They have
done so by replacing the legal standard applied in sexual
harassment cases or by placing guardrails on the application of the
severe or pervasive standard under their state human rights law in
order to ease the burden for plaintiffs.5
This Note examines one such state effort. In June 2020,
Minnesota became one of the most recent states to attempt a
change, with the Minnesota Supreme Court reevaluating the severe
or pervasive standard’s application to sexual harassment cases
brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) in
Kenneh v. Homeward Bound.6 After failed efforts in the state
legislature to change the standard statutorily,7 the Kenneh court

3. Marshall H. Tanick, Perspectives: Is Severe or Pervasive’ Too Severe or
Perverse?, MINN. LAW. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://minnlawyer.com/2020/01/20
/perspectives-is-severe-or-pervasive-too-severe-or-perverse/ [https://perma.cc/P623BY4N] (“The ‘severe or pervasive’ terminology coupled with the rather restrictive
way it generally has been interpreted by the courts has raised the hackles of many
claimants, nearly all of them women, and their advocates. They view the phrase and
the strict treatment frequently accorded it by courts as creating undue hurdles that
are often difficult to overcome.”).
4. ANDREA JOHNSON, RAMYA SEKARAN & SASHA GOMBAR, NAT’L WOMEN’S L.
CTR., 2020 PROGRESS UPDATE: METOO WORKPLACE REFORMS IN THE STATES 16–17
(2020).
5. California “enacted legislation to clarify the ‘severe or pervasive standard’”
in 2018. New York “explicitly remove[d] the restrictive ‘severe or pervasive’ standard
for establishing a hostile work environment claim” in 2019. Id. Delaware passed a
law that establishes the standard for sexual harassment as conduct which “has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an employee’s work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” 81 Del. Laws
399 (2018); see also Leslie A. Pappas, Delaware Expands Sexual Harassment
Protections to More Workers, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2018), https://news.bloomberg
law.com/daily-labor-report/delaware-expands-sexual-harassment-protections-tomore-workers-1 [https://perma.cc/6CHJ-KQPV] (explaining how the new Delaware
law protects more workers by broadening the categories of workers covered under
the law and requiring employers to distribute information sheets about sexual
harassment to employees).
6. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 226 (Minn. 2020).
7. H.F. 4459, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2018); S.F. 2295, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 2019).
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acknowledged the shortcomings of the severe or pervasive standard
and addressed its scope and function. Though the court retained the
standard, it wrote, “[f]or the severe-or-pervasive standard to remain
useful in Minnesota, the standard must evolve to reflect changes in
societal attitudes towards what is acceptable behavior in the
workplace.”8 The court also cautioned lower courts against
“usurping the role of a jury when evaluating a claim on summary
judgment,” noting that “whether the alleged harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work
environment is ‘generally a question of fact for the jury.’”9
The Kenneh ruling prompted both praise and critique by
workers and victims’ advocates,10 but the question remains as to
what, if any, impact the Kenneh court’s interpretation of the severe
or pervasive standard may have on lowering the barriers to justice
for plaintiffs bringing hostile work environment sexual harassment
claims under the MHRA. This Note will critically analyze the
Kenneh decision’s attempt to answer that question. Part I will
provide background on the severe or pervasive standard’s
development and application, critique of the standard, calls for
change fueled by the #MeToo movement, and state responses to
those calls for change. Part II will critique the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s approach in Kenneh by analyzing whether it adequately
addresses the severe or pervasive standard’s shortcomings for
plaintiffs and proposing additional needed change.
This Note argues that Kenneh’s approach has the potential to
serve greater justice for victims of sexual harassment in the
workplace by directing lower courts to use summary judgment
sparingly in such cases, increasing the likelihood that juries will
hear cases and thus apply their post-#MeToo conceptions of sexual
harassment to cases. However, Kenneh’s impact on plaintiffs’ ability
to seek justice under the MHRA will ultimately be limited: though

8. Kenneh, 944 N.W.2d at 231.
9. Id. at 232 (citing Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 901
(7th Cir. 2018)).
10. See Kevin Featherly, Sexual Harassment Cases Through a New Lens, MINN.
LAW. (June 10, 2020), https://minnlawyer.com/2020/06/10/sexual-harassment-casesthrough-a-new-lens/ [https://perma.cc/6WW9-V9KU] (citing both an attorney who
called the ruling “landmark” for plaintiff employees and another attorney who
argued that “the ruling does not fundamentally alter the landscape because it
neither changes the framework for summary judgment nor dismantles the review
standard.”); see also Susan Fitzke, Severe or Pervasive Remains the Standard to
Evaluate Claims of Sexual Harassment in Minnesota, JD SUPRA (June 7, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/severe-or-pervasive-remains-the-12721/
[https://perma.cc/QGU8-6JC2] (calling the ruling a “significant victory” for
employers).
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providing some guardrails for lower courts’ use of the severe or
pervasive standard and rejection of federal case law as precedent,
the Kenneh court’s retention of the federal standard’s language
risks also retaining the confusion that has plagued its application
and erroneous reliance on federal case law. In order for Minnesota
to make lasting change in its sexual harassment legal protections,
it will need to adopt a new standard, either judicially or
legislatively, that will distance it from the harmful precedent of
federal sexual harassment law, and the previous Minnesota case
law that relied on federal precedent.
I. Background
A thoughtful analysis of Kenneh v. Homeward Bound requires
an understanding of the legal and political background of the severe
or pervasive standard. This section briefly describes the
development of the severe or pervasive standard, outlines
significant criticism of the standard, discusses the interaction of the
standard’s application with the #MeToo movement, and provides
examples of strategies adopted by two other jurisdictions
responding to the severe or pervasive standard’s shortcomings for
plaintiffs.
A. Development of the Severe or Pervasive Standard
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination against individuals in several protected groups,
including on the basis of sex.11 In 1986, the Supreme Court held in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson “that a plaintiff may establish a
violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex
has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”12 The Court
then outlined the standard for the plaintiff to prove their hostile
work environment case based on allegations of sexual harassment:
“For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s]
employment and create an abusive work environment.’”13 Further,
under that standard, the plaintiff must prove that the work
environment was both objectively and subjectively hostile or
abusive.14
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
12. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
13. Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
14. Carol Schultz Vento, Annotation, When is Work Environment Intimidating,
Hostile or Offensive, so as to Constitute Sexual Harassment Under State Law, 93
A.L.R.5th 47, at § 2 (2001).
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The Court affirmed Meritor’s severe or pervasive standard
seven years later in Harris v. Forklift Systems, and elaborated that
determining whether a work environment is hostile or abusive
requires “looking at all the circumstances,” including “the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.”15 The Court has minimally refined or commented on
the standard since,16 so the elements established by Meritor and
Harris remain the defining language of the severe or pervasive
standard as applied to sex discrimination cases based on creation of
a hostile work environment through sexually harassing workplace
conduct.17
A
significant
majority
of
states
have
enacted
antidiscrimination laws that mirror Title VII and are interpreted to
prohibit sexual harassment.18 Though Title VII itself does not
contain the words “severe or pervasive,” most states, including
Minnesota, have treated the standard as “a free-standing tenet” of
anti-discrimination law, with lower courts adopting the Supreme
Court’s standard and utilizing federal case law as precedent in
construing state statutes and deciding sexual harassment cases.19
B. Critique
Scholars and advocates have critiqued the severe or pervasive
standard as disproportionately burdensome for plaintiffs, with this
burden growing over time. “As a result of this heightened burden,
lower courts routinely dismiss claims alleging sexual misconduct
15. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo
Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 238 (2018) (noting that Oncale v. Sundowner, 523
U.S. 75 (1998), refined the standard, including by “caution[ing] courts against
enforcing Title VII’s anti-harassment mandate as a ‘civility code’”).
17. See, e.g., Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1130 n.86 (D.
Kan. 2017) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67, and Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, in
analysis of Title VII sexual harassment claims).
18. Rachel Farkas, Brittany Johnson, Ryann McMurry, Noemi Schor & Alison
Smith, State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 421, 424
(“[F]orty-seven states and Washington, DC have implemented anti-discrimination
statutes that either expressly or impliedly prohibit sexual harassment in the private
workplace.”). But cf. CONTE, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that “[T]he conditions under
which a state action can be maintained will vary under the terms of the statute . . .”);
Farkas et al., supra note 18, at 435 (“While most state statutes at least partially
mirror Title VII, many go further to effectively expand Title VII anti-discrimination
protections to cover LGBT workers and workers in settings with fewer than fifteen
employees.”).
19. Tanick, supra note 3; see CONTE, supra note 1.
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that is sometimes flagrant.”20 Critics cite numerous cases in which
plaintiffs allege “egregious conduct that, in many cases, would be
criminal or at least would outrage any reasonable person.”21 For
example, one plaintiff in the Eighth Circuit failed to clear the severe
or pervasive hurdle to survive dismissal of their hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim even when alleging that “the
supervisor grabbed and squeezed the employee’s nipple while
stating ‘this is a form of sexual harassment.’”22 Another plaintiff’s
case was dismissed despite alleging, amongst other actions, “that a
harasser asked him to watch pornographic movies and to
masturbate together” and “suggested that the plaintiff would
advance professionally if the plaintiff caused the harasser to
orgasm.”23 Scholars offer several explanations for these
exasperating results for plaintiffs, as will be discussed below.
1. Who is Reasonable?
First, the flexible nature of the standard has given lower
courts significant discretion in determining what behavior is severe
or pervasive enough to create a hostile or abusive work environment
for a “reasonable” person.24 The standard does “not differentiate
between genders, obfuscating whether it ought to be viewed
through the prism of a hypothetical woman, man, or asexual
individual.”25 It also does not acknowledge how contextual factors
20. Kenneth R. Davis, The “Severe and Pervers-ive” Standard of Hostile Work
Environment Law: Behold the Motivating Factor Test, 72 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 401,
416–17 (2020).
21. Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment to Be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and
Conditions” of Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 119 (2003); see also Tippett, supra
note 16, at 241.
22. Sheila Engelmeier & Heather Tabery, Severe or Pervasive: Just How Bad
Does Sexual Harassment Have to Be in Order to Be Actionable?, MSBA,
https://www.mnbar.org/archive/msba-news/2020/01/21/severe-or-pervasive-justhow-bad-does-sexual-harassment-have-to-be-in-order-to-be-actionable
[https://perma.cc/HPY8-CLYH] (citing Duncan v. Cnty. of Dakota, 687 F.3d 955, 959
(8th. Cir. 2012)) [hereinafter Engelmeier & Tabery, Severe or Pervasive?].
23. Id. (citing LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 394 F.3d 1098 (8th
Cir. 2005)).
24. See Tippett, supra note 16, at 237.
25. Tanick, supra note 3; see also Jones & Wade, supra note 2, at 219 (“What
remains unclear is whether the allegedly harassing behavior is to be evaluated from
the point of view of a reasonable person—or whether the standard should be that of
a reasonable woman, or a reasonable victim in the plaintiff’s shoes. . . . Importantly,
each of [these] standards . . . necessitates a different level of attention to the specific
context and power dynamics between the parties. . . . [E]mployment of a reasonable
person standard perpetuates existing inequalities by failing to adjust for experiential
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such as “race, class, gender identity, and age,” create power
dynamics that influence how sexual harassment is targeted by
harassers and perceived by victims.26 Therefore, judges, who are
arguably “not as sensitive to the realities of what may or may not
be acceptable in the workplace,”27 have underestimated and
diminished “the severity of harassment and the impact it would
have on a reasonable person” when analyzing a plaintiff’s prima
facie case.28 This has, on the whole, disadvantaged plaintiffs and
blocked them, based on the potentially limited worldview of the
judge, from having their cases heard by peer-comprised juries.29
2. Narrowing Over Time, or “The Infinite Regression of
Anachronism”
Second, the judicial discretion in interpreting the severe or
pervasive standard has built on itself to allow more and more

differences.”); Druhan V. Blair, Severe or Pervasive: An Analysis of Who, What, and
Where Matters When Determining Sexual Harassment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 355, 356–
57 (stating that because of the vagueness of the severe or pervasive standard and
“because individuals have different perceptions of what behaviors are severe enough
to constitute harassment,” three scholarly proposed legal ideas—“the reasonable
woman standard, the acknowledgment that individuals view supervisor harassment
as more severe, and the importance of workplace integration”—“should . . . be
integrated into sexual harassment law”).
26. Jones & Wade, supra note 2, at 214, 219–20.
27. Tanick, supra note 3.
28. Evan D. H. White, A Hostile Environment: How the “Severe or Pervasive”
Requirement and the Employer’s Affirmative Defense Trap Sexual Harassment
Plaintiffs in a Catch-22, 47 B.C. L. REV. 853, 875 (2006); see also Elizabeth M.
Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the Substantive Law
Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 773–78 (2012–2013) (describing how the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Twombly and Iqbal, which invite “the exercise of judicial
subjectivity, for judges to ‘fill in the gaps’ of the truncated factual or legal record with
what ‘they know’ or, more significantly, what they think they know” in order to
determine “plausibility” at the pleading stage, are problematic for plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases, if not through outright dismissal, then at least
through an “impact on the subsequent [procedural] rulings that a judge must make—
the discovery that a court allows (for example, only discovery on the ‘plausible’
claims), the class certification decision, and the efficacy of expert testimony” which
“make summary judgment for the employer even more likely”).
29. Tanick, supra note 3; see Engelmeier & Tabery, Severe or Pervasive?, supra
note 22; see also Michael W. Pfautz, What Would a Reasonable Jury Do? Jury
Verdicts Following Summary Judgment Reversals, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1285
(2015) (citing Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy:
Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313,
320, 338–39 (2012)) (“[S]tudies have empirically shown how judicial behavior can
vary based on a judge’s personal background. Weinberg and Nielsen powerfully
demonstrate that white judges grant summary judgment in employment
discrimination cases more often than minority judges do. . . . And judges may be out
of touch with the workplace experiences of most Americans.”).
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egregious workplace behavior over time.30 Williams et al., call this
trend “the ‘infinite regression of anachronism,’” or
the tendency of courts to rely on cases that reflect what was
thought to be reasonable ten or twenty years ago, forgetting
that what was reasonable then might be different from what a
reasonable person or jury would likely think today. These
anachronistic cases entrench outdated norms, foreclosing an
assessment of what is reasonable now.31

In her study of sexual harassment case law in several circuits
fifteen years after Meritor was decided, Beiner calls the trend
simply, “Bad Precedent Leads to Bad Precedent.”32 For example, in
the 1993 case Saxton v. AT&T Co., the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the employer, finding that
despite the plaintiff alleging that her supervisor had “rubbed his
hand along her upper thigh,” and “pulled her into a doorway and
kissed her,” amongst other harassing behaviors, no “reasonable
person would find that her supervisor’s conduct created a hostile
environment.”33 Saxton was cited positively by courts in the
Seventh Circuit more than three hundred times by 2001, and in
seventy-nine of those cases that positive citation occurred in the
context of the citing court’s severe or pervasive analysis.34 In the
2019 case analysis by Williams et al., the authors note that
subsequent citing cases like those discussed by Beiner “use the
infinite regression of anachronism to ratchet up the standard for
what constitutes a hostile environment in their circuit.”35 In other
words, courts use outdated decisions as comparators for current
cases and find no harassment took place if those comparators had

30. Sarah David Heydemann & Sharyn Tejani, Legal Changes Needed to
Strengthen the #METOO Movement, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 237, 245–54 (2019);
see also Tippett, supra note 16, at 241–42 (discussing how lower courts have
interpreted “severe or pervasive” to be overly stringent, snowballing as judges have
been provided an ever growing body of law supporting a “crimped interpretation”);
Davis, supra note 20, at 425 (noting the original EEOC guidelines made no mention
of “severe or pervasive,” and it has not supported this restrictive interpretation by
the Supreme Court); JOHNSON, SEKARAN & GOMBAR, supra note 4, at 16–17
(highlighting that New York and California have enacted legislation to remove or
clarify the “severe or pervasive” standard to correct for the overly restrictive
interpretation developed by the courts).
31. Joan C. Williams, Jodi L. Short, Margot Brooks, Hilary Hardcastle, Tiffanie
Ellis & Rayna Saron, What’s Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the
Norm Cascade, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 139, 145 (2019).
32. Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and
Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 817–18
(2002); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
33. Beiner, supra note 32, at 814–15.
34. Id. at 818, n.129.
35. Williams et al., supra note 31, at 145.
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similar fact patterns to the case at hand. This trend becomes both
more problematic and entrenched over time. Thus, the vague
content of the severe or pervasive standard, its interpretation by
judges, and its narrowing over time, has made it more and more
difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the behavior they were subjected
to passes the severe or pervasive threshold.36
3. The “Norm Cascade”
The discrepancy between the severity or pervasiveness
necessary to constitute a hostile work environment at summary
judgment and an average person’s conception of sexual harassment
that creates an intolerable work environment has become more
pronounced in the wake of the #MeToo movement.37 This movement
went viral on social media in 2017,38 after the New York Times
36. Former U.S. District Judge Nancy Gertner has also described the role of
“Asymmetric Decisionmaking” in contributing to the disproportionate barriers faced
by plaintiffs generally in federal employment discrimination cases:
When the defendant successfully moves for summary judgment in a
discrimination case, the case is over. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the judge must “state on the record the reasons for granting or
denying the motion,” which means writing a decision. But when the plaintiff
wins, the judge typically writes a single word of endorsement—“denied”—and
the case moves on to trial. Of course, nothing prevents the judge from writing a
formal decision, but given caseload pressures, few federal judges do. . . . The
result of this practice—written decisions only when plaintiffs lose—is the
evolution of a one-sided body of law. Decision after decision grants summary
judgment to the defendant . . . . After the district court has described—cogently
and persuasively, perhaps even for publication—why the plaintiff loses, the case
may or may not be appealed. If it is not, it stands as yet another compelling
account of a flawed discrimination claim. If it is appealed, the odds are good
that the circuit court will affirm the district court’s pessimistic assessment of
the plaintiff’s case. . . . Although judges do not publish all the opinions they
write, the ones they do publish exacerbate the asymmetry. The body of
precedent detailing plaintiffs’ losses grows. Advocates seeking authority for
their positions will necessarily find many more published opinions in which
courts granted summary judgment for the employer than for the employee. . . .
But the problem is more than just the creation of one-sided precedent that other
judges follow. The way judges view these cases fundamentally changes. If case
after case recites the facts that do not amount to discrimination, it is no surprise
that the decisionmakers have a hard time envisioning the facts that may well
comprise discrimination. Worse, they may come to believe that most claims are
trivial.
Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 113–15 (2012).
37. Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 30, at 248; see also Ann C. McGinley,
#MeToo Backlash or Simply Common Sense?: It’s Complicated, 50 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1397, 1416 (2020) (describing the difference between cultural and legal
definitions of sexual harassment, where “culture often finds harassment even though
the law would say the behavior is not sufficiently severe or pervasive . . .”).
38. Though providing a more in-depth history of the #MeToo movement is beyond
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published allegations against Harvey Weinstein for predatory
sexual behavior.39 Unlike previous instances in which highly
publicized sexual harassment cases have led to a temporary surge
in public attention on the issue,40 change in societal understanding
of sexual harassment after #MeToo may be longer lasting.

the scope of this Note, it is important to highlight how the viral launch and staying
power of #MeToo after the Times Weinstein article and speaking out of high-profile
celebrities, though important and admirable, “illustrates the critical need for an
intersectional approach [to discussions of gender and sexual harassment]” through
the differential way in which the claims of working class women and women of color
are treated in comparison to upper-class white women. Jones & Wade, supra note 2,
at 208. Jones and Wade explain:
Me Too did not begin in 2017, nor did it begin on Twitter or Facebook. The
phrase Me Too was first coined in 2006 by Tarana Burke, a Black woman
activist who had just 500 Twitter followers when the Times’ article broke. In
2006, Burke was living and working in Alabama where she had just founded
Just Be, Inc. The organization’s goal was to empower and promote the general
wellbeing of young girls of color. In her work with Just Be, Burke encountered
a number of girls who, both knowingly and unknowingly, disclosed experiences
of sexual violence not unlike her own. Burke set up a ‘Me Too’ Myspace page to
raise awareness of the issue and to establish a supportive community. This
Myspace page was Me Too’s first virtual home, and soon, Me Too became an
organization. Thus, from its inception, Me Too was intended “to help survivors
of sexual violence, particularly Black women and girls, and other young women
of color from low wealth communities, find pathways to healing.”
Despite Burke’s best efforts, the hashtag and the term did not go viral for over
a decade. It was not until October 2017 when the Weinstein exposé broke and
high-profile celebrities began to speak out about their experiences that the
movement amassed widespread attention and support. . . . [W]ealthy celebrities
and upper-middle-class White women are more likely than lower-income women
and women of color to garner attention when they speak. Their concerns are
taken more seriously, and they are more likely to be believed.
...
Erasure of the activism and experiences of poor women and women of color
is . . . part of the social discourse in the United States; it is also reflected in the
ways in which U.S. law is taught and created.
Id. at 208–10.
39. CONTE, supra note 1, at 1 (“Bloomberg analyzed statistics of allegations since
the New York Times reported allegations of serial predation by Harvey Weinstein a
year ago, and found that at least 425 prominent people across industries, including
state and local lawmakers, have been publicly accused of sexual misconduct, a broad
range of behavior that spans from serial rape to lewd comments and abuse of power.
According to the National Women’s Law Center, in the past year, state legislators
introduced over 100 bills to strengthen protections against workplace harassment,
and 11 states and two localities have passed new protections.”).
40. L. Camille Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a Legal Movement
Too? 3 (Ctr. for Interdisc. L. & Pol’y Stud. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, No. 453, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=323630
9# (“Prior incidents in which sexual harassment has grabbed the national attention,
such as the allegations made by Law Professor Anita Hill in 1991 against nowAssociate Justice of the United States Supreme Court Clarence Thomas, have
arguably not had staying power.”).
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Williams et al., argue that #MeToo is a “norm cascade” and the
impact is here to stay:
Typically social norms change slowly. In the late
1990s . . . sexual harassment was seen as a “tsking” matter:
Only 34% of Americans thought it was a serious problem.
Then came Alyssa Milano’s #MeToo tweet on October 15, 2017,
which was retweeted over a million times across eighty-five
countries. Almost immediately, the percentage of Americans
who believe that sexual harassment is a serious problem shot
up to 64%. By late 2017, roughly 75% of Americans believed
that sexual harassment and assault were “very important”
issues for the country. That is a norm cascade.41

For Williams et al., this norm cascade magnifies the
importance of juries in sexual harassment hostile work
environment cases, access to which the severe or pervasive
standard has disproportionately functioned to deny.42 The authors
argue that juries, not judges, should be given the opportunity to
inform “community standards of appropriate behavior in the
workplace” by “grappling with facts and establishing norms about
what conduct is considered appropriate in the age of #MeToo.”43
McGinley suggests that sending all sexual harassment hostile
work environment cases to juries is not the only solution to adapting
the law to the norm cascade, as judicial norm perceptions may also
be subject to the shift.44 Thus, McGinley argues that in response to
the #MeToo movement, “[c]ourts should change their strict
interpretation of the sex- and gender-based harassment cases by
jettisoning reliance on cases decided before the norm cascade and,
41. Williams et al., supra note 31, at 142; see also Cass R. Sunstein, #MeToo as
a Revolutionary Cascade, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 262, 271 (2019) (arguing that
the #MeToo movement meets the three conditions of a “revolutionary cascade” (“(a)
preference falsification, (b) diverse thresholds, and (c) interdependencies”) and has
revealed a change in “preferences, experiences, beliefs, and values,” and has been
“about the transformation of preferences, beliefs, and values . . .”).
42. Williams et al., supra note 31, at 224; see also supra Section I.B.
43. Williams et al., supra note 31, at 224. However, despite the #MeToo
movement, juries’ evaluations of credibility are still informed by sexist stereotypes
which can continue to harm plaintiffs. See Nicole Brodeur, People Are More Likely to
Believe Sexual Harassment Claims from Women Who Are ‘Conventionally Attractive,’
Study Says, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/featured/sns
-study-more-likely-believe-sexual-harassment-attractive-women-20210222-dalk43e
mgndrbeff2og33lsm5m-story.html [https://perma.cc/K69H-WAJQ] (describing study
published in January 2021 which found that “people are more apt to believe sexual
harassment claims by women who are young, ‘conventionally attractive’ and appear
and act feminine. Women who don’t fit that prototype not only are less likely to be
believed, but also are presumed to be unharmed by harassing behavior . . . .” Thus
“[t]he findings have implications for workplaces and courtrooms, where credibility
and perceived harm are important to making a case . . .”).
44. McGinley, supra note 37, at 1424.

444

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 40: 2

in doing so, analyze cases with reference to how reasonable jurors
would react today, given the norm cascade.”45
C. Calls for Change: State Law Approaches to Change
In addition to scholarly critique and recommendations for
legal adaptations, the #MeToo Movement has brought about
increased calls for change and political attention to those calls. In
response, state legislatures have introduced bills addressing
employer practices, such as by limiting nondisclosure agreements
where employers prevent employees from discussing their
experience of discrimination or harassment, and requiring antiharassment training.46 Several states have also specifically
attempted to reform the severe or pervasive standard in recognition
of its role in blocking victims’ access to justice.47 These reforms have
taken the approach of adopting an entirely new standard to replace
severe or pervasive, or retaining the standard but “adding
guardrails to the ‘severe or pervasive’ language to indicate expressly
how the standard should and should not be interpreted.”48
1. Adoption of a New Standard: New York City and State
New York is not the only state that has adopted a new
standard for analysis of hostile work environment sexual
harassment cases,49 but it serves as a case study here. Even before
45. Id. But see Pfautz, supra note 29 (documenting disproportionate rate of
summary judgment errors in civil rights cases).
46. JOHNSON, SEKARAN & GOMBAR, supra note 4, at 2 (“Three years after #MeToo
went viral, the unleashed power of survivor voices has led to more than 230 bills
being introduced in state legislatures . . . .”); Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 30,
at 255; see also Tamra J. Wallace, Nine Justices and #MeToo: How the Supreme
Court Shaped the Future of Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Claims,
72 ME. L. REV. 417, 418 (2020) (describing how “the Supreme Court’s continued
stance to liberally applying the [Federal Arbitration Act] to uphold arbitration
agreements contained within employment agreements over the past decades”
necessitates legislation to protect vulnerable workers who have been victims of
workplace sexual harassment); Christopher Cole, End ‘Forced Arbitration,’ Ex-Fox
Host Carlson Urges House, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.law360.com/employ
ment/articles/1354189/end-forced-arbitration-ex-fox-host-carlson-urges-house
[https://perma.cc/M9TL-6PJC] (providing an example of current federal
congressional debate on the issue of arbitration and sexual harassment).
47. JOHNSON, SEKARAN & GOMBAR, supra note 4, at 16–17.
48. Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 30, at 255.
49. See Kathryn Barcroft, Hostile Work Environment: Is NYC’s Standard the
Path Forward in the Era of #MeToo?, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2019/04/11/hostile-work-environment-is-nycs-standard-thepath-forward-in-the-era-of-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/8YV7-8BQW] (“Delaware is
another state that has taken affirmative action to modify the standard for sexual
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the #MeToo movement, New York City recognized that their local
Human Rights law had “‘been construed too narrowly to ensure
protection of the civil rights of all persons covered by the law’” and
“passed the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005” to “assert
that the provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law
(NYCHRL) were to be ‘construed independently from similar or
identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.’”50 This
began an iterative process between the legislature and courts that
ultimately led to adoption of a new standard by both the city and
state legislatures for analysis of sex discrimination claims asserting
creation of a hostile work environment through sexual
harassment.51
That iterative process continued in 2009, when the New York
State Appellate Division had the first opportunity to interpret the
city’s Restoration Act as applied to a sexual harassment hostile
work environment case.52 The court held that the City’s instruction
to courts in the Restoration Act to construe the Human Rights Law
“more broadly than federal civil rights laws and the State [Human
Rights Law]” required a rejection of the severe or pervasive
standard, which “has routinely barred the courthouse door to
women who have, in fact, been treated less well than men because
of gender.”53 The court thus adopted a new standard: “For [Human
Rights Law] liability, therefore, the primary issue for a trier of fact
in harassment cases, as in other terms and conditions cases, is
whether the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that she has been treated less well than other employees because of
her gender.”54 The court explained that this new standard would
both maximize deterrence and align more closely with other
discrimination liability standards.55 This new standard was
explicitly adopted by the City in 2016 in a second Restoration Act.56
harassment claims. Delaware HB 360, which went into effect January 1st, broadens
the definition of a hostile work environment in Delaware’s Discrimination in
Employment Act, in recognition of the high bar to sexual harassment claims. The
new Delaware law provides that sexual harassment is unlawful if the conduct
‘creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.’”).
50. Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 30, at 255–56 (citing N.Y.C. LOC. L. NO. 85
(2005); N.Y.C. Human Rights Law, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-101–107 (2005)).
51. Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 30, at 255–57.
52. Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); see also
Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 30, at 255–57 (describing New York City’s adoption
of a new standard).
53. Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 73–74 (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 78.
55. Id.
56. Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 30, at 257; Barcroft, supra note 49, at 2.
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New York State, with momentum from the #MeToo movement
and using New York City’s lowered burden of proof as guidance,
passed legislation amending its anti-discrimination law to
eliminate the severe or pervasive standard.57 Instead, an employer
is liable for harassment “when it subjects an individual to inferior
terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the
individual’s membership in one or more of these protected
categories,” including sex, “regardless of whether such harassment
would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to
harassment claims.”58 New York’s local and state courts and
legislatures thus each played roles in the replacement of the severe
or pervasive standard in its anti-discrimination, anti-harassment
law.
2. Interpretation Guardrails: California
California took a different approach to updating its sexual
harassment law in the wake of #MeToo. The California legislature
passed a bill, which took effect on January 1, 2019, that added a
section to California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act
“declar[ing] its intent with regard to application of the laws about
harassment contained in this part.”59 The bill does not strike the
severe or pervasive standard language but adopts Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg’s articulation of the plaintiff’s burden of proof
under the standard, set forth in her concurrence in Harris v. Forklift
Systems:
[I]n a workplace harassment suit the plaintiff need not prove
that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of
the harassment. It suffices to prove that a reasonable person
subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the
plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions
as to make it more difficult to do the job.60

The law goes on to affirm, or reject, specific holdings of several
Ninth Circuit and California state court sexual harassment cases in
order to place further guidelines on the standard’s application.61 In
doing so, the law establishes that “[a] single incident of harassing
conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence

57. Engelmeier & Tabery, Severe or Pervasive?, supra note 22, at 25 (citing N.Y.
Sess. A8421 (N.Y. 2019)).
58. N.Y. Sess. A8421, 2 (N.Y. 2019).
59. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923 (West 2019).
60. Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25–26 (1993)) (internal
quotations omitted).
61. Barcroft, supra note 49; Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 30, at 258–59; see
JOHNSON, SEKARAN, & GOMBAR, supra note 4, at 17.
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of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or
created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment”;
that “a discriminatory remark, even if not made directly in the
context of an employment decision or uttered by a non-decision
maker, may be relevant, circumstantial evidence of discrimination”
in order to establish a hostile work environment; and that “[t]he
legal standard for sexual harassment should not vary by type of
workplace.”62 Finally, the law states that, “[h]arassment cases are
rarely appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.”63
With this background in place, this Note will now analyze the
unique approach to potential legal evolution of the severe or
pervasive standard taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Kenneh v. Homeward Bound.
II. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound: Critiquing Minnesota’s
Approach
Like many other states, the Minnesota legislature
reconsidered the state’s sexual harassment law following the 2017
#MeToo movement, attempting both New York’s approach of
rejecting the severe or pervasive standard and California’s
approach of placing guardrails on the standard’s application.64 The
Minnesota House introduced a bill in 2018 to amend the MHRA
definition of sexual harassment.65 The bill rejected the application
of the federal severe or pervasive standard to MHRA sexual
harassment claims, explicitly stating, “[a]n intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment . . . does not require the harassing conduct or
communication to be severe or pervasive.”66
The Minnesota Senate took a different approach in the bill it
introduced in 2019.67 Like California’s legislation,68 this bill
retained the severe or pervasive standard but sought to modify its
application.69 The bill stated that “courts should not be bound by
prior federal case law holding that conduct does not rise to the level
62. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1293 (West 2019) (rejecting Brooks v. City of San Mateo,
229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000); affirming Reid v. Google, Inc., 235 P.3d 988 (Cal. 2010);
disapproving Kelley v. Conco Cos., 196 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)).
63. Id. (affirming Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 4th. Supp. 243
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009)).
64. See supra Part I.C.
65. H.F. 4459, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2018).
66. Id.
67. S.B. 2295, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019).
68. See supra Part I.C.2.
69. S.B. 2295, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019).
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of actionable sexual harassment if the conduct described therein
would be considered severe or pervasive in the state” and
specifically rejected the holdings of several Eight Circuit cases “as
inconsistent with the severe or pervasive standard for sexual
harassment under state law.”70 Further, though the bill noted that
“state law is not a general civility code” nor a “strict liability statute”
for employers, it provided that “a single significant instance of
harassing conduct or communication” may constitute severe or
pervasive harassment.71
The Minnesota Supreme Court took up the issue shortly after
neither of the bills passed, granting review in Kenneh v. Homeward
Bound.72
A. Case Summary and Holdings
Assata Kenneh brought a sexual harassment claim against
her employer, Homeward Bound, under the MHRA, alleging that
the actions of a co-worker, Anthony Johnson, created a hostile work
environment.73 These actions, occurring between the months of
February and June 2016, included offering to cut Kenneh’s hair in
his home the first day they met, telling Kenneh that he “‘likes it
pretty all day and night’” and “‘beautiful women and beautiful
legs,’” “talking to [Kenneh] in a seductive tone and lick[ing] his lips
in a suggestive manner,” telling Kenneh “‘I will eat you–I eat
women,’” following Kenneh to a gas station, and repeatedly calling
Kenneh “‘sexy,’” “‘pretty,’” and “‘beautiful,’” and “simulat[ing] oral
sex with his tongue.”74
Kenneh made a written complaint to Homeward Bound, which
resulted in an investigation and an assurance from Homeward
Bound “that Johnson would receive additional sexual harassment
training and would be instructed not to be alone with Kenneh.”75
When Johnson’s behavior continued despite the investigation and
training, Kenneh made two additional complaints to her supervisor,

70. Id. (rejecting holdings in McMiller v. Metro, 738 F.3d 185 (8th Cir. 2013);
Anderson v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Ark., Inc., 579 F.3d 858, 860 (8th Cir. 2009);
LeGrand v. Area Resources for Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 394 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2005);
and Duncan v. General Motors Co., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002)).
71. Id.
72. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 231 (Minn. 2020); Fitzke,
supra note 10 (“Shortly after the House bill failed, the Minnesota Supreme Court
granted review in Kenneh.”).
73. Kenneh, 944 N.W.2d at 228.
74. Id. at 226–27.
75. Id. at 227.
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which again resulted in no change.76 In June 2016, Kenneh “arrived
late to work and was unprepared for a meeting” because “she did
not want to come to work because of Johnson.”77 Homeward Bound
then denied Kenneh’s request to “return to a flex-schedule position
that would allow her to avoid interactions with Johnson,” and
terminated Kenneh’s employment.78
The district court found that Johnson’s conduct failed to satisfy
the severe or pervasive standard for sexual harassment, hostile
work environment claims, calling the standard a “high bar” for
actionable sexual harassment.79 The court thus granted summary
judgment to Homeward Bound, finding that though “‘some of the
conduct was ‘boorish and obnoxious’ and that the statement, ‘I will
eat you. I eat women,’ was both ‘objectively and subjectively
unacceptable,’’” the conduct “does not constitute pervasive, hostile
conduct that changes the terms of employment and exposes an
employer to liability under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.”80
After the court of appeals affirmed, Kenneh sought review in
the Minnesota Supreme Court.81 Kenneh, with the support of six
amici, asked the court to abandon the severe or pervasive standard
and associated federal precedent in analysis of hostile work
environment sexual harassment claims.82 Kenneh and supporting
amici argued “that the severe-or-pervasive standard is notorious for
its inconsistent application and lack of clarity” and that “federal
courts tend to interpret the meaning of ‘severe or pervasive’
archaically, which places federal interpretations directly at odds
with Minnesota’s statutory directive to construe the Human Rights
Act liberally.”83 Homeward Bound argued in response that rejecting
the severe or pervasive standard would interfere with the need for
legal consistency and predictability, including across state lines,
and that the court “must exercise judicial restraint” because the
state legislature “has recently shown an interest in redefining
sexual harassment . . . .”84
The court rejected Kenneh’s request, holding that “Kenneh has
not presented us with a compelling reason to abandon our
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 228.
80. Id. (quoting directly from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment
in Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-17-391).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 229; Fitzke, supra note 10.
83. Kenneh, 944 N.W.2d at 230 (citing Minn. Stat. § 363A.04).
84. Id.
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precedent,” and that the severe or pervasive standard “continues to
provide a useful framework for analyzing the objective component
of a claim for sexual harassment under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act.”85 However, the court continued, “tak[ing] this
opportunity to clarify how the severe-or-pervasive standard applies
to claims under the Human Rights Act.”86 The court’s first point of
clarification was that Minnesota courts utilizing the standard are
not bound by federal decisions utilizing the same framework.87
Second, “[f]or the severe-or-pervasive standard to remain useful in
Minnesota, the standard must evolve to reflect changes in societal
attitudes towards what is acceptable behavior in the workplace.”88
Third, the court emphasized the fact-intensive nature of an inquiry
into whether sexual harassment rises to the level of severe or
pervasive: “each case in Minnesota state court must be considered
on its facts, not on a purportedly analogous federal decision. A
single severe incident may support a claim for relief.”89 At the same
time, “[p]ervasive incidents, any of which may not be actionable
when considered in isolation, may produce an objectively hostile
environment when considered as a whole.”90 In order to maintain
the fact-intensiveness of the inquiry, the court “caution[ed] courts
against usurping the role of a jury when evaluating a claim on
summary judgment,” emphasizing that “whether the alleged
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to create a
hostile work environment is ‘generally a question of fact for the
jury.’”91
Applying this clarified standard to Kenneh’s case, and
“[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,” the court
“conclude[d] that Kenneh presented sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to decide, on an objective basis, that Johnson’s
alleged behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
substantially interfere with her employment or to create an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment.”92
Therefore, “[t]he district court . . . erred in granting summary
judgment to Homeward Bound.”93

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 230, 226.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 231–32 (citations omitted).
Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 233.
Id. at 234.
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B. Early Commentator Response
That the Kenneh court took time to clarify how the severe or
pervasive standard should be applied indicates that it will have
some impact on future cases. Yet, the mixed response of
commentators closely involved with the Kenneh decision
demonstrates that this impact was not immediately clear following
the case. One attorney who filed an amicus brief in support of
Kenneh praised the decision, calling “the ruling ‘a landmark,’ even
though it preserves the standard that his brief argued against,”
because it “lowers the bar for purposes of establishing illegal
harassment,” “explicitly rejects the previously favored approach of
deferring to federal precedent when deciding these cases,” and
states that “these cases should be decided at trial, not on summary
judgment.”94
Yet, another brief-filing attorney disagreed, “argu[ing] the
ruling does not fundamentally alter the landscape because it
neither changes the framework for summary judgment nor
dismantles the review standard.”95 Another observer called the
decision “a significant victory for employers,” elaborating that the
court’s retention of the severe-or-pervasive standard “allows
employers greater predictability under the MHRA. Kenneh made
clear that any attempt to change the MHRA’s sexual harassment
definition will have to go through the legislature.”96
Others have suggested that the Kenneh decision lies
somewhere between a landmark for plaintiff employees and a
victory for defendant employers, concluding that the court’s
retention of the standard combined with its emphasis on the
evolution of workplace norms and focus on the facts of each case
amounts to a “nuanced” though “significant shift for hostile work
environment claims under the MHRA.”97
C. Impact and Insufficiency
It is still too early to know the aggregate effect of Kenneh’s
clarification of sexual harassment standards on the outcomes in
lower Minnesota courts. This Note argues that while recent
decisions indicate that Kenneh’s caution regarding summary
judgment has slightly influenced lower courts’ considerations,
94. Featherly, supra note 10.
95. Id.
96. Fitzke, supra note 10.
97. Sheila Engelmeier & Heather Tabery, Paskert and Kenneh: The ‘Severe or
Pervasive’ Standard in 2020, 77 BENCH & BAR MINN. 24, 29 (2020) [hereinafter
Engelmeier & Tabery, Paskert and Kenneh].
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ultimately, there is reason to be skeptical that the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s holdings will be sufficient to give plaintiffs
meaningful relief. A critique of Kenneh’s potential impact on
summary judgment as well as the retention of the severe or
pervasive standard follows.
1. Summary Judgment
Since Kenneh was decided in June 2020, there has only been
one lower court summary judgment decision applying Kenneh to a
sexual harassment claim brought under the MHRA.98 In the case,
Schroeder v. Axel H. Ohman, Inc., Schroeder alleged that her coworker made graphic sexual comments on at least four occasions
over the course of approximately one year.99 Eventually, and after
a series of potentially retaliatory actions by the employer following
Schroeder’s report of the harassment, she left the job and was hired
at a different company.100 On the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, the District Court analyzed Schroeder’s federal Title VII
sexual harassment claims and state MHRA claims jointly.101 The
court cited Kenneh as “rejecting employee’s attempt to renounce
federal severe-or-pervasive standard but clarifying that a MHRA
sexual harassment claim must be considered on its facts, not on a
purportedly analogous federal decision.”102 Applying “the standard
under both Title VII and the MHRA [of] whether a reasonable
person could find the alleged behavior objectively abusive or
offensive, and that Plaintiff actually perceived the conduct as
abusive,” the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, finding that “[h]ere, Plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find the alleged
behavior was objectively abusive or offens[ive].”103
On the one hand, Schroeder’s citation to Kenneh’s emphasis on
making fact-intensive considerations of MHRA sexual harassment
claims might be perceived as a step toward interrupting the

98. As of electronic searches conducted via Westlaw and LexisNexis on February
6, 2021.
99. Schroeder v. Axel H. Ohman, Inc., No. 19-1836 (MJD/TNL), 2021 WL 396779,
at *1–2 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2021) (describing the statements that plaintiff alleged her
co-worker made to her, including that he could “‘see her tits’”; stating “‘you like it
bent over,’ ‘I bet you can’t handle eight inches,’ ‘I would show you, but I don’t want
to hurt you,’ . . . . ‘You know I got a big dick,’ ‘That’s not a sock I got in there. That’s
my real bulge,’ and ‘Do you want to look at it?’”).
100. Id. at *4.
101. Id. at *4–6.
102. Id. at *5.
103. Id. at *6.
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injustice that plaintiffs have endured in both state and federal
sexual harassment cases when judges have quickly disposed of their
claims based on precedent allowing egregious conduct on the part
of defendants.104 Yet, this optimism is undercut, even in light of
summary judgment being denied to the employer here, by the
court’s joint state and federal analysis, which demonstrates that
courts may not actually interpret sexual harassment claims under
the MHRA differently after Kenneh, an argument which will be
explored further in the following section.
Courts have also applied Kenneh’s summary judgment
cautions to non-sexual harassment claims. In the weeks
immediately after the Kenneh decision, a district court denied
summary judgment to the defendant in a personal injury case,
emphasizing that, “[i]ndeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently
‘cautioned’ trial courts ‘against usurping the role of the jury when
evaluating a claim on summary judgment.’”105 Another district
court trial order cited Kenneh’s warning in an employment injury
case, writing in a denial of summary judgment to the defendant:
[T]he current state of the law in Minnesota state courts is clear:
in granting summary judgment, trial courts should be cautious
when there are contested facts about what really happened. As
recently as last week, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed
an order granting summary judgement. . . . The decision in this
order is to apply the law as decided by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. . . . [The plaintiff] is entitled to have a jury decide the
merits of his case.106

Similarly, in August of 2020 the Court of Appeals of Minnesota cited
Kenneh in its reversal of a district court grant of summary judgment
to the defendant medical clinic in a medical malpractice suit.107
Though these cases did not involve sexual harassment claims,
they indicate that the Kenneh decision is influencing courts to be

104. See supra Part I.B.
105. Krause v. Martinez, No. 27-CV-19-2618, 2020 WL 4915385, at *4 (D. Minn.
June 30, 2020) (citing Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., No. A18-0174, 2020 WL
2893352, at *6 (Minn. June 3, 2020), as “reiterating that ‘[S]ummary judgment is a
blunt instrument’ that is ‘inappropriate when reasonable persons might draw
different conclusions from the evidence presented’”).
106. Reed v. Soo Line R.R. Co., No. 27-CV-18-10179, 2020 WL 4218226, at *3 (D.
Minn. June 9, 2020) (citing Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., No. A18-0174, 2020
WL 2893352 (Minn. June 3, 2020)).
107. Ingersoll v. Innovis Health, LLC, No. 60-CV-17-1135, 2020 WL 4434605, at
*2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2020) (citing Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944
N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020)) (“Appellant argues that the district court erred when
it granted summary judgment . . . because the actions of appellant and her husband
were not, as matters of law, intervening, superseding causes of her husband’s death.
We agree.”).
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more hesitant generally in granting summary judgment. That
hesitancy in future sexual harassment cases may lead to a greater
number of those cases being heard by juries, whose conceptions of
workplace behavior are more likely to correspond with post-#MeToo
norms, thus increasing opportunities for relief for plaintiffs.108
Conversely, lower courts have also cited Kenneh in non-sexual
harassment cases granting summary judgment, demonstrating that
judges have not taken Kenneh to mean that summary judgment
should be denied blindly, and countering the argument that jury
trials will soon excessively burden the judicial system and clog up
the courts.109 However, even if Kenneh does result in a greater cost
to the system due to more cases reaching juries,110 this expense is
justified by the need to remedy the disproportionate burden that
has been borne by sexual harassment plaintiffs and the importance
of jury access in achieving justice in these cases.111
2. Retention of “Severe or Pervasive”
The Kenneh decision’s statements regarding summary
judgment may lead to more cases being heard by juries, thus
making initial strides in addressing the inequality for plaintiffs in
sexual harassment law in Minnesota. However, if the MHRA, and
the decisions interpreting it, are to truly reflect evolving workplace
norms and provide a means of protection against harmful workplace
behavior, the Minnesota Supreme Court or the legislature will need
to explicitly reject Minnesota’s utilization of the severe or pervasive
standard, as the standard’s bounds and specifics of application
remain elusive and, this Note argues, will continue to
disproportionately disfavor plaintiffs by allowing continued reliance
on outdated precedent.

108. See supra Part I.B.3.
109. See, e.g., Novak v. Gjerde & Pederson, No. 19HA-CV-20-314, 2020 WL
7296627 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2020); Casanova v. Tri-Cnty. Cmty. Corr., No. 60-CV-182160, 2020 WL 4280999 (Minn. Ct. App. July 27, 2020); Enerwise Power Sol. Corp.
v. Renewable Energy Fund, LLC, No. 27-CV-19-7420, 2020 WL 6882791 (D. Minn.
Sep. 25, 2020).
110. See Scott Brister, The Decline of Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47
S. TEX. L. REV. 191, 209 (2005) (“While estimates vary, some estimate that the
marginal cost of each jury trial is ten times that of each bench trial.”).
111. See supra Part I.B.; see also Williams et al., supra note 31, at 145–47 (arguing
that in order to interrupt the “infinite regression of anachronism” which has unjustly
limited access to juries by sexual harassment plaintiffs, and in light of the updated
conceptions of workplace norms following the #MeToo movement, “[e]ven judges who
felt confident that they knew what was reasonable in the past should not assume
they know what Americans believe is reasonable today. Those judges should be more
inclined to let juries decide what’s reasonable now”).
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The Kenneh court stated that “[o]ur use of the of the severe-orpervasive framework from federal Title VII decisions does not mean
that the conclusions drawn by those courts in any particular
circumstances bind Minnesota courts in the application of our state
statute.”112 Yet, retaining the standard means that courts will
continue to cite the federal law which established it and the state
cases which adopted it, as the Minnesota Supreme Court itself did
in Kenneh.113 Additionally, though the Kenneh court specifically
overruled the application of the severe or pervasive standard in one
Minnesota Court of Appeals case,114 and wrote disapprovingly of
statements made in several others,115 its attempt to clarify the
standard’s application, in discussing Title VII as well as MHRA
claims, fails to provide explicit guidance to lower courts as to which
previous interpretations to disregard and which to embrace.
California’s recent sexual harassment cases support the
hypothesis that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s retention of the
severe or pervasive standard will result in similar application as
before the Kenneh clarification, and lower courts will continue to
cite to the outdated case law that Kenneh discouraged. The
California legislature’s approach to updating its sexual harassment
law, by amending the law to clarify the intended application of the
severe or pervasive standard and cautioning courts against
disposing of sexual harassment cases on summary judgment, is
similar to Kenneh’s approach, but is more specific.116 Whereas
Kenneh only explicitly overrules a portion of a previous case,117 the
California legislation attempted to set firm boundaries on the
standard for courts by endorsing the reasoning of three different
decisions, and rejecting two others.118

112. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 230–31 (Minn. 2020).
113. See id. at 229, 231 (discussing the development of the severe or pervasive
standard in federal Title VII law and the adoption of the standard in Minnesota).
114. Id. at 231 n.4 (“To the extent that the court of appeals’ analysis in GeistMiller, 783 N.W.2d 197, is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled.”).
115. Id. at 231 (“Today, reasonable people would likely not tolerate the type of
workplace behavior that courts previously brushed aside as an ‘unsuccessful pursuit
of a relationship,’ or ‘boorish, chauvinistic and decidedly immature . . . .’”) (citing
Geist-Miller v. Mitchell, 783 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); Duncan v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 935 (8th Cir. 2002); McMiller v. Metro, 738 F.3d 185,
188–89 (8th Cir. 2013)).
116. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923 (“The Legislature hereby declares its disapproval
of any language, reasoning, or holding to the contrary in the decision Kelley v. Conco
Companies (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 191.”).
117. Kenneh, 944 N.W.2d at 231.
118. The law states, in part:
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Yet, despite those specific boundaries, it is not clear that lower
courts have updated their application of the severe or pervasive
standard to hostile work environment sexual harassment claims or
interrupted the “infinite regression of anachronism” that has
developed out of the federal law.119 For example, in the 2019 case
Jernigan v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, a
California trial court evaluated a state law hostile work
environment claim after the updated legislation’s enactment.120 In
its hostile work environment analysis which culminated in granting
summary judgment to the employer, the court cited Lewis v. City of
Benicia, which cites to Kelley v. The Conco Companies, one of the
cases explicitly disapproved of in the sexual harassment
legislation.121 The case also cites to Fuentes v. AutoZone, Inc. in
supporting its decision, a case which cites to the United States
Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
contrary to the California legislature’s endorsement of Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg’s concurrence.122 In doing so, the trial court avoided
[T]he Legislature affirms its approval of the standard set forth by Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg in her concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993) 510 U.S.
17 that in a workplace harassment suit “the plaintiff need not prove that his or
her tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment. It suffices
to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would
find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as
to make it more difficult to do the job.” (Id. at 26) . . . . A single incident of
harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence
of a hostile work environment. In that regard, the Legislature hereby declares
its rejection of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s opinion
in Brooks v. City of San Mateo (2000) 229 F.3d 917 and states that the opinion
shall not be used in determining what kind of conduct is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute a violation of the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act . . . .[T]he Legislature affirms the decision in Reid v. Google, Inc.
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 in its rejection of the ‘stray remarks doctrine.’ . . . In
determining whether or not a hostile environment existed, courts should only
consider the nature of the workplace when engaging in or witnessing prurient
conduct and commentary is integral to the performance of the job duties. The
Legislature hereby declares its disapproval of any language, reasoning, or
holding to the contrary in the decision Kelley v. Conco Companies (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 191. Harassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposition on
summary judgment. In that regard, the Legislature affirms the decision in
Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243 and its observation
that hostile working environment cases involve issues ‘not determinable on
paper.’”
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923.
119. See supra Part I.B.2.
120. Jernigan v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., No. BC703698, 2019 Cal.
Super. LEXIS 12827 (Cal. Sup. Dec. 6, 2019).
121. Id. at *8; Lewis v. City of Benicia, 224 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1519, 1525 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923.
122. Jernigan, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 12827, at *8; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923;
Fuentes v. AutoZone, Inc., 200 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1221, 1227 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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citing directly to the particular cases forbidden by the updated
legislation, but because it was applying the severe or pervasive
standard, it continued to cite to the line of cases which have
established the narrowed standard over time.123
Jackson v. Pepperdine University, a 2020 case, also
demonstrates the manner in which California courts continue to
treat the federal severe or pervasive standard and the “updated”
state standard in substantially the same way.124 In the case, the
court explicitly discussed whether its analysis would differ based on
the recent California legislation because whether that legislation
would be retroactive was in dispute.125 The court did not address
the retroactivity issue, determining that “both before and after its
enactment, the totality of the circumstances Jackson alleged do not
reflect conduct sufficiently severe to constitute actionable sexual
harassment.”126 The court acknowledged its inability under the
legislation to rely on certain precedent, but concluded that the
formulation of a court’s inquiry into what constitutes a hostile work
environment under the new legislation is “extremely similar” to
that established by earlier case law.127
These post-legislation California cases demonstrate that,
because the severe or pervasive standard originated in Title VII law
and has permeated sexual harassment cases in both federal and
state contexts, it is unlikely that it can shake its origins and history
and be applied in a new and unique manner to state Human Rights
Act hostile work environment claims. The early embodiment of this
minimally altered application of the severe or pervasive standard
in Minnesota is seen in the Schroeder case discussed above.128 In
Schroeder, the district court wrote that the elements of a Title VII
and an MHRA hostile work environment sexual harassment claim
are the same, and confirmed that under both types of claims, the
court analyzes the harassing conduct under the severe or pervasive
standard.129 Schroeder’s side-by-side application of the standard to
federal and state claims thus demonstrates the risk that courts will
brush aside the Kenneh court’s direction that, “[i]n Minnesota, the
standard must evolve to reflect changes in societal attitudes
123. See supra Part I.B.2.
124. Jackson v. Pepperdine Univ., No. B296411, 2020 WL 5200946, at *1–10 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2020).
125. Id. at *1.
126. Id. at *2.
127. Id. at *9.
128. Schroeder v. Axel H. Ohman, Inc., No. 19-1836 (MJD/TNL), 2021 WL 396779
(D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2021).
129. Id. at *5.
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towards what is acceptable behavior in the workplace,”130 and
instead continue to apply the standard in the same pre-Kenneh way,
citing the precedent that the Kenneh court hoped to evolve
beyond.131
This risk of federal courts engaging in joint Title VII and
MHRA sexual harassment hostile work environment analyses that
fail to acknowledge any unique qualities of the severe or pervasive
standard under Minnesota law is especially true as the Eighth
Circuit, just a few months prior to Kenneh, retained the severe or
pervasive standard in Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc.,
“doubling down on the notion that the severe or pervasive standard
sets a tremendously ‘high threshold,’ at least in federal courts
applying federal law in this jurisdiction.”132 With the United States
Supreme Court subsequently denying Paskert’s petition for
certiorari, the severe or pervasive standard remains ensconced in
federal law and the federal cases pose a danger of continuing to
inform state precedent through side-by-side Title VII and MHRA
hostile work environment analyses.133
D. Recommendations for Further Change
Because of the continuing lack of clarity and risk of confusing
influence of federal precedent, as well as state precedent that relied
on federal law, the Minnesota Supreme Court or Minnesota state
legislature should reject the severe or pervasive standard and adopt
a new standard in order to increase the ability of plaintiffs to have
a meaningful opportunity for justice when bringing sexual

130. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 231 (Minn. 2020).
131. The difficulty of applying an “evolved” or “expanded” standard by trial courts
has been demonstrated in disability law. In 2008, Congress passed the Americans
with Disabilities Act Amendments Act [ADAAA], which “explicitly disavow[ed] the
reasoning of the four Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the scope of the
[Americans with Disabilities Act]’s disability definition.” Stephen F. Befort, An
Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 2027, 2042–43 (2013). However, while the “ADAAA emphasizes that
the definition of disability should be broadly construed and clarifies and expands the
definition’s meaning in several ways,” there is some evidence that courts have
continued to interpret the definition of disability in a less-than-expansive way, thus
mitigating the increase in plaintiff-friendly outcomes intended by the ADAAA. Id. at
2042–43, 2066–68.
132. Engelmeier & Tabery, Paskert and Kenneh, supra note 97, at 25 (citing
Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2020)).
133. Michael Angell, High Court Won’t Weigh in on Bar for Sex Harassment
Claims, LAW360 (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1335107/print?
section=appellate [https://perma.cc/86JH-5UVV]; see also Engelmeier & Tabery,
Severe or Pervasive?, supra note 22 (“Minnesota state law cases are invaded by the
8th Circuit’s standard.”).
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harassment claims under the MHRA. One option for this rejection
and adoption of a new standard would be to build on California’s
approach. California’s legislation “affirm[ed] its approval” for
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s standard proposed in her
concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Systems, that a plaintiff in a
hostile work environment sexual harassment case must prove “that
a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would
find . . . that the harassment so altered working conditions as to
‘ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job.’”134 However, instead of solely
“affirming” that standard, either the Minnesota Supreme Court or
legislature should explicitly denounce the severe or pervasive
standard and replace it with Ginsburg’s.
Based on the Kenneh court’s reluctance to overturn precedent,
particularly in the realm of statutory interpretation, this
replacement of the severe or pervasive standard would ideally be
enacted by the state legislature.135 Because the MHRA does not
actually contain the words “severe or pervasive,”136 this legislation
would likely take the form of amending the MHRA to denounce the
severe or pervasive standard and related precedent and to insert
the new standard, as proposed in a previous bill.137
However, if the legislature fails to act, the replacement of the
standard by the Minnesota Supreme Court is possible and justified.
As noted, the severe or pervasive standard is not codified in the
MHRA, and was not expressly adopted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court as the standard for interpreting hostile work environment
sexual harassment cases until 2013.138 Thus the court would not be
overturning any statutory language but instead would overturn the
case which adopted that standard for interpreting the statute.139
Though the Kenneh court expressed a desire to maintain stability

134. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25
(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
135. Kenneh, 944 N.W.2d at 230 (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis has special force
in the area of statutory interpretation because the Legislature is free to alter what
we have done.”) (citing Schuette v. City of Hutchinson, 843 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn.
2014)).
136. Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363A.03 (2020).
137. H.F. 4459, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2018) (“An intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment under paragraph (a), clause (3), does not require the
harassing conduct or communication to be severe or pervasive.”).
138. Brief for Emp. Law. Ass’n Upper Midwest, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., (No. A18-0174), 2018 WL 5111128, at
*3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 17, 2018) (citing Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832
N.W.2d 790, 796–97 (Minn. 2013)).
139. Id.

460

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 40: 2

in the law under stare decisis,140 it failed to mitigate the
inconsistency and instability of the law it was choosing to retain,
instead making the contradictory suggestion that the standard
must evolve.141 As this Note has argued, maintaining the standard
with its inconsistent and frequently offensive precedent for the sake
of stability, while also modernizing with society, poses the risk both
of continued inconsistency and lack of evolution as applied in the
lower courts.142 As the Minnesota Supreme Court has previously
stated, “[s]tare decisis promotes stability in the law, but it ‘does not
bind [the court] to unsound principles.’”143 The severe or pervasive
standard has proven to be “unsound,” and rejecting it can better
serve the public policy of the MHRA of protecting employees against
harm and promoting workplace safety and equality.144 Further, like
in New York, where the state legislature subsequently enacted a
law following that new court-adopted standard,145 the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s replacement of the severe or pervasive standard
in the next hostile work environment sexual harassment case may
140. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota recently defined the doctrine of stare
decisis as:
[A] foundation stone of the rule of law that instructs appellate courts to stand
by yesterday’s decisions. Stare decisis is the preferred course because it
promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process. “The doctrine of stare decisis
directs us to adhere to our former decisions in order to promote the stability of
the law and the integrity of the judicial process.” Adherence to the principle of
stare decisis promotes the important values of “stability, order, and
predictability.”
State v. Ahmed, No. 19-1222, 2020 Minn. App. LEXIS 266, at *4–5 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 6, 2020).
141. Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 231 (Minn. 2020).
142. See supra Part II.C.
143. Cargill, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 784 N.W.2d 341, 352 (Minn. 2010)
(citing Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 2000)).
144. See Brief for Emp. Law. Assoc. Upper Midwest, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant, Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., No. A18-0174, 2018 WL
5111128, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. May 17, 2018) (“The public policy underlying the
MHRA sexual harassment prohibition has been highlighted on a national scale in
recent months. Sexual harassment remains prevalent in the American workplace
and remains a substantial hurdle for working women. Minnesota Department of
Human Rights Commissioner Kevin Lindsey recently . . . cited a 2016 Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission report stating that 85% of women report
having suffered sexual harassment on the job. Sexual harassment is not isolated or
rare but has rather been a hidden epidemic. The public policy underlying the
MHRA’s prohibition of sexual harassment has not been served by the Court’s
insertion of the ‘severe or pervasive’ standard into its definition.” (internal citations
omitted)). Contra Kenneh, 944 N.W.2d at 230 (“Homeward Bound argues that,
because the Legislature has recently shown an interest in redefining sexual
harassment, we must exercise judicial restraint.”).
145. See supra Part I.C.1; N.Y. Sess. A8421 (N.Y. 2019).
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provide the needed support for the state legislature to pass
associated legislation amending the MHRA to incorporate the new
standard.
Conclusion
The Minnesota Supreme Court took an initial step to increase
the opportunity for justice for victims of workplace sexual
harassment in Kenneh v. Homeward Bound Inc., specifically in its
warning to lower courts about granting summary judgment to
defendant employers and depriving plaintiffs of a jury trial.
However, this step is ultimately insufficient for Minnesotans
seeking protection under the MHRA. In order to truly break free
from the current sexual harassment precedent, which has
disproportionately burdened plaintiffs, the Minnesota legislature or
Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt a new standard for hostile
work environment sexual harassment claims. Combined with
Kenneh’s summary judgment holdings, this new standard can set
Minnesota apart from the federal law that has harmed victims, and
better fulfill the MHRA’s policy goals of protecting the civil right of
discrimination-free employment for all Minnesotans.146

146. Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363A.02 (2020).

